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On Primary Computation

Primary computation is not a particular kind of being. Nor can it be identified with being in itself. Primary computation is potentiality and considered in itself it is pure potentiality. Here I am thinking of primary computation in a similar way that Aristotle explains that "by matter I mean that which, not being a 'this' actually, is potentially a 'this' (Aristotle, Aristotle Book VIII). For primary computation alone has only potential existence and that without form there would be nothing but mere primary computation. Primary computation is not a 'this', it is only ever potentially a 'this'. Primary computation is, therefore not a thing – a substance without form cannot be said to exist. As Aristotle argues, Since the substance which exists as underlying and as matter is generally recognized, and this that which exists potentially, it remains for us to say what is the substance, in the sense of actuality , of sensible things (Aristotle, Book VIII

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